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Some Remarks on the Economic Development of the 
Komnenian Byzantium
JAN BRANDEJS
The Komnenian period of Byzantium (1081–1185) constitutes a curious era 
of social and economic development. Often regarded as the period of the so-
called feudalization, the regime of Komnenoi was often blamed for creating 
a social situation which was prone to internal destabilization. An era of 
diminishing resources and unfulfilled hopes, the 12th century was presented 
as the last chance for revival, which ultimately turned to naught with the 
sack of Constantinople in 1204. In recent decades, however, a new approach 
based on expanding archaeological evidence suggests quite a different picture 
– the expanding cities and once again burgeoning trade certainly brought 
a new era of prosperity into Byzantium.1 Put into contrast with the eventually 
triumphing western civilization, the logic of continuous decline suited well the 
1  The most influential is possibly M. Hendy, Byzantium, 1081–1204: An Economic Reappraisal, 
in: Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Vol. 20, 1970, pp. 31–52. There are various 
works analysing the development from multiple angles (church, army, culture…) or dealing 
with a detailed topic (particular emperor, relations with the Crusader states and/or the West). 
If there is any overview of the 12th century period, it is often a part of a monograph of a wider 
chronological scale. See among others: M. Angold (Ed.), The Byzantine Aristocracy, IX to 
XIII Centuries, Oxford 1984.; M. ANGOLD, Church and Society in Byzantium under the 
Comneni 1081–1261, Cambridge 1995; M. ANGOLD, The Byzantine Empire, 1025–1204: 
A Political History, London, New York 1997; J. W. BIRKENMEIER, The Development of 
the Komnenian Army: 1081–1180, Boston 2002; J.-C. CHeyneT, Pouvoir et contestations 
à Byzance (963–1210), Paris 1990; J. HALDON, Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine 
World, 565–1204, London 1999; J. HARRIS, Byzantium and the Crusades, London 2003; A. 
HARVEY, Economic Expansion in the Byzantine Empire, 900–1200, Cambridge 1989; J.-D. 
HOWARD-JOHNSTON (Ed.), Byzantium and the West, c. 850–c. 1200, Amsterdam 1998; A. 
P. KAZHDAN – A. J. WHARTON, Change in Byzantine Culture in the Eleventh and Twelfth 
Centuries, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 1985; R.-J. LILIE, Byzanz und die Kreuzzüge, 
Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 2004; P. MAGDALINO, The Empire of Manuel I Komnenos, 1143–
1180, Cambridge 1993; M. MULLETT – D. SMYTHE (Eds.), Alexios I Komnenos, Belfast 
1996; D. M. NICOL, Byzantium and Venice: A Study in Diplomatic and Cultural Relations, 
Cambridge 1988.
Jan Brandejs
Some Remarks on the Economic Development of the Komnenian Byzantium
14
meta-narratives trying to explain the so denominated ‘special’ way of western 
historical development.
The purpose of this article is to identify some of the factors which 
contributed to this economic revival and rectify the image of Byzantium in the 
12th century (although much of this work is nearly finished and as far as modern 
Byzantinology is concerned, the currently projected concepts of Komnenian 
Byzantium are already fundamentally different from those imagined by great 
historians of the older era, such as Georgij Ostrogorsky).2 Although most of 
the topics concerned with social development in this époque were widely 
described in various works, a modern comprehensive analysis containing 
the findings and imbuing this knowledge with political development is still 
absent. The author does not intend to fill this, albeit increasingly reduced, void 
with an article of such humble proportions – the main aim is to identify certain 
factors in the socioeconomic development of Komnenian period which were 
often a major source of confusion in older literature and point out various 
interesting developments which render Byzantium a unique social system 
among its peers, so as to prepare grounds for a future comparison between the 
Byzantine Empire and state formations of various other ‘civilizations’.
With the death of Basil II in 1025, during whose reign Byzantium 
achieved notional peak of its middle époque, comes an era of rapidly 
changing emperors.3 Often regarded as the time of weakening of the state, 
this approach might be rectified. In a sense, the administration still worked, 
though many times it became pawn of both local and higher political 
elites which used riches accumulated by state or their position for their 
2  More specifically: G. OSTROGORSKY, Pour l’histoire de la féodalité byzantine, Brussels 
1954; G. OSTROGORSKY, Observations on the Aristocracy in Byzantium, in: Dumbarton 
Oaks Papers, Vol. 25, 1971, pp. 1–32.
3  Although the era of Basil II is often considered extreme, as the emperor held almost 
unprecedented power due to his victory in civil war and army of Varangian guard. M. 
ANGOLD, Belle époque or crisis? (1025–1118), in: J. SHEPARD (Ed.), Cambridge History 
of the Byzantine Empire, Cambridge 2008, p. 585.
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own benefits.4 Nevertheless, the edicts and political decisions decided by 
emperors were still widely implemented.
The problem laid in the fact that these measures were often contradictory 
as emperors were exchanged before they could implement their policy in full and 
were not simply able to grasp the situation adequately to implement much needed 
reforms. The resulting strife then led to a long-lasting civil war between 1071 and 
1081, which was ignited by the battle of Mantzikert in 1071, during which the 
reigning emperor Romanos IV Diogenes was, in the first time of Byzantine history, 
captured by the enemy. Subsequent rebellions turned any decision proclaimed by 
the new government ruling in the name of Emperor Michael VII futile, as different 
pretenders were warring with one another or with armies loyal to the emperor 
most of the time.5 This was brought to an end by the member of the foremost 
Byzantine family, Alexios Komnenos, who ascended on throne to rule the next 
almost 40 years, during which the governmental and administrative system was 
stabilized, although with significant changes.
Instead of evaluating one’s position based on office he held (or the 
institution of an honorary title, which by this time inflated in numbers to such an 
extent that it became virtually hollow), the social standing of an individual would 
be from that moment on based on his kinship relation towards the emperor. 
Alexios then proceeded to present most of the offices of the state to loyal family 
members. Although even in Komnenian period (1081–1185) a high position 
could be achieved on merit alone, this was mostly supplemented by marrying 
into one of the noble families. This system, however, was prone to misuse as 
those who were affiliated with the emperor in such a way tried to acquire parts 
of territories for themselves or tried to overthrow the ruling regime for their own 
benefits, particularly after the death of Manuel I Komnenos in 1180.6
4  P. STEPHENSON, Byzantium Transformed, in: Medieval Encounters, Vol. 10, Is. 1, 2004, 
p.186.
5  M. ANGOLD, The Byzantine Empire 1025–1204: A Political History, New York 1997, pp. 
115–124.
6  See M. ANGOLD, The Road to 1204: The Byzantine Background to the Fourth Crusade, in: 
Journal of Medieval history, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 257–278.
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This observation might lead to a semblance that the internal situation 
of the state was fragile – but none could be farther from the truth. In fact, 
Byzantium experienced major economic boom for the most of the Komnenian 
period. The roots of this rise of economy in the 11th and 12th century can be traced 
to the developments occurring hundreds of years earlier. In the 8th century, 
the époque of periodically repeated epidemics came to a conclusion and, 
gradually, the population of the Byzantine Empire experienced a new revival. 
Similarly to the development in Western Europe, the more favourable climate 
conditions coincided with the dwindling of hostile raids – in Byzantium’s 
case, Arabic annual raids into Asia Minor’s interior, which prevented the 
creation of larger estates and thus forestalled the increase of social inequality.7 
As Byzantine power reached new heights and was able to mount a successful 
drive towards acquiring new territories, the countryside began to reshape its 
internal structure in a profound way. The vast landholdings rose and with them 
powerful provincial élite came into existence. Furthermore, as the society 
increased in numbers, new land was colonised and in doing so additional 
resources were brought into circulation within the Byzantine economy. This 
development manifested the most potently in the 11th and 12th centuries.
One single example can manifest the power of this economic revolution 
– whereas in 1025 the Empire had roughly 19 million of inhabitants, Byzantium 
reached the same level towards the last decades of the 12th century. Given the 
fact that during this period the Byzantine state suffered profound territorial 
losses – losing the whole of Armenia as well as most of Asia Minor, which 
used to constitute Byzantium’s core provinces and the most vital source of 
manpower – the Komnenian revival can be described as anything but a void. 
Some estimates put Constantinople’s population at 400,000, while Thessaloniki 
with 150,000 inhabitants remained the second most important. Other cities 
7  Although substantial decrease in raids occurred after the capture of Melitene and 
Theodosioupolis in 934 and 949 respectively. J. SHEPARD, Equilibrium to Expansion (886–
1025), in: J. SHEPARD (Ed.), The Cambridge History of the Byzantine Empire, Cambridge 
2008, p. 509.
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such as Korinth and Monemvasia, Ohrid, Thebes, Ioanina, Euchatia and 
Amorion remained administrative and military centres but in contrast to the 
most of the era of Macedonian dynasty they now constituted important and 
thriving commerce hubs.8
However, this revival of commerce did not necessarily influence the 
elite, which perceived the trade as more or less a necessary evil but certainly 
not a venture enhancing one’s social prestige. Although merchant families 
themselves successfully attained a degree of influence over policy-making 
process, particularly during the 11th century, this came generally to a halt due 
to Komnenoi’s utilization of family-oriented system of government. Instead 
of conducting long distance trade, the elite facilitated clearing new swaths 
of land in order to be utilized for agricultural purposes. This was further 
exacerbated by the trade treaties concluded with Italian maritime republics, 
namely Venice.9 The basis of these treaties was reduced custom rate on Italian 
merchants’ goods. Although these were not as catastrophic as they were 
portrayed in older historiography and in fact facilitated the Empire’s economic 
growth in early years, in long term the treaties reduced Byzantium’s economic 
competitiveness.
Due to the Byzantine élite’s relation towards merchant ventures, the 
development of fiscal apparatus did not mirror the vast increase in trade. 
Instead, the further exploitation of land supplemented enough profits and 
in the 11th century also contributed to the increase of Emperor’s property. 
However, any such development was often countered by donations of land to 
monasteries and landowning élite or issues of tax exemptions to individuals or 
institutions.10 Although the donations were a common practice, they reached 
8  A. LAIOU – C. MORRISON, Byzantine Economy, Cambridge 2007, pp. 130–131, 138.
9  A. LAIOU, Exchange and Trade, in: A. LAIOU et al. (Eds.), The Economic History of 
Byzantium: From the Seventh Century Through the Fifteenth Century, Washington 2002, pp. 
751–752; STEPHENSON, p. 203.
10  J. W. BIRKENMEIER, The Development of the Komnenian Army, Leiden, Boston, Köln 
2002, p. 174. Due to absence of purgatory in eastern Christianity, the effort to retain God’s 
grace and the fascination with monastic life was a typical feature of Byzantine society. In an 
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an unprecedented scale in tumultuous years of the 1070s and 1080s.11 Both 
Nikephoros III Botaneiates and Alexios I Komnenos were forced to distribute 
large swaths of state land in order to strengthen their regime. Once Alexios 
managed to regain internal stability, the tides have turned and the Byzantine 
administrative apparatus started vigorously obtaining taxes once again.12
In order to improve the state of the fiscal apparatus, the Emperor 
turned to a thorough reform of the taxation system. Instead of taxing land 
based on its quality and collective responsibility of village communities, 
the burden of tax toll was passed onto each individual, more precisely the 
owner of the so called praktikon, a register of all his possessions. Although 
such system did not possess the effectiveness of the preceding one, in times 
of financial insecurity and only gradually improving economic situation the 
new tax system did not require such complexity and therefore allowed the 
state to obtain much needed taxes with relative ease. Fiscal assessments were 
conducted regularly, from the time Alexios I under the auspices of Sekreton 
ton oikeakon, an office originally designated to administer Emperor’s personal 
holdings.13 Furthermore, the state still possessed enough means and authority 
environment full of intrigue and political struggle, the aristocracy sought support and council 
from monastic communities. Extensive donations of land to monasteries were of widespread 
occurrence. R. Morris, The Byzantine Aristocracy and Monasteries, in: M. ANGOLD (Ed.), 
The Byzantine Aristocracy, IX to XIII Centuries, Oxford 1984, p. 117. The monasteries, most 
prominently the largest ones of Athos, were often granted tax exemption, exkousseia, by the 
Emperor. STEPHENSON, p. 190. Similar privileges were often given to great landholders. 
Apart from few exceptions, the tax exemptions were however limited to secondary taxes. 
LAIOU – MORRISON, p. 156.
11  A. HARVEY, The Land and Taxation in the Reign of Alexios I Komnenos: The Evidence of 
Theophylakt of Ochrid, in: Revue des Études Byzantines, Vol. 51, No. 1, 1993, pp. 140–141.
12  The pressure applied by the state was substantially difficult to avoid, even for large 
landholders and high ranking ecclesiastics. Harvey refers to the case of Theophylakt of 
Ochrid, who despite having vast connections reaching to the highest echelons of Byzantine 
society was not able to obtain tax privileges for his office. HARVEY, The Land and Taxation, 
p. 153. As soon as Alexios I’s position was sufficiently strengthened, he did not hesitate to 
utilise even confiscations as means to consolidate the position of his family and limit financial 
capabilities of potential opponents. P. FRANKOPAN, Land and Power in the Middle and 
Later Period, in: J. F. HALDON (Ed.), A Social History of Byzantium, Oxford 2009, p. 115.
13  STEPHENSON, p. 202. For additional reforms of Alexios I Komnenos, see P. 
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to confiscate property if the government desired so, most often when the 
proprietor owned more land than he could cultivate.14
As the increase of economic activity gained momentum during the 11th 
century, the state was presented with various obstacles, particularly in regard 
to monetary policy. The main purpose of currency in the eyes of Imperial 
administration was to constitute a payment to administrative officials and 
soldiers. The currency was for a long time maintained in Imperial coffers and 
then in fixed point of the year given to various servants of the state, thus 
eliminating its possible circulation. The understanding of currency as means 
of exchange or a tool with which further support of economic growth is 
possible was not completely unknown in the circles of Byzantine intellectual 
elite, but was considered of secondary importance.15 Paradoxically, it was 
the very growth of economy which presented a problem for Byzantine state 
– the increase in trade exchanges required a greater amount of currency in 
circulation, which the state was not capable of providing.16 Despite quite 
successful implementation of new currency hyperpyron replacing the devalued 
nomisma, the state simply could not rigidly hold on to the vast portions of 
MAGDALINO, Justice and Finance in the Byzantine State, in: A. LAIOU – S. DIETER 
(Eds.), Law and Society in Byzantium, 9th–12th Centuries, Washington 1994, p. 108–111.
14  HARVEY The Land and Taxation, p. 147. M. ANGOLD, Church and Society in Byzantium 
under the Comneni, Cambridge 2000, p. 318. Indeed, the confiscations based on fiscal survey 
occurred quite regularly. HARVEY, The Land and Taxation, pp. 150–151.
15  STEPHENSON, p. 191. It is difficult to discern to what extent Byzantines understood the 
functions of currency and what consequences such action could cause. According to Angeliki 
Laiou, the monetary system of Alexios was one of the most sophisticated in the whole history 
of the Byzantine Empire and mirrored an effort to accommodate the needs of the market. 
There were a number of educated men in Komnenian Byzantium who were interested in 
the function of economy, market and currency. One of the most important was Michael of 
Ephesus, the author of commentaries on one of Aristotle’s treatise on the role of currency and 
trade in society, mostly mentioned in Nicomachean Ethics. LAIOU – MORRISON, pp. 151, 
162.
16  STEPHENSON, pp. 191, 196. Bearing in mind the concept of Komnenian monetary policy, 
it is a question whether this could not have been rather inability instead of unwillingness. For 
the fiscal stability of Byzantine state, see M. HENDY, Studies in the Byzantine Monetary 
Economy, Cambridge 1985, pp. 221–224.
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money as before (which then could have been dispersed in the form of roga).17 
This might have been one of the motivations behind the creation of the pronoia, 
a new fiscal system in which a soldier controlled certain part of land with 
paroikoi, non-proprietary peasants settled there and paying rent in kind or in 
cash. Similar arrangements were often conducted when a tax from certain city 
or region was promised to high-ranking officials in exchange for their services. 
Consequently, pronoia should not be understood as the basis of feudalisation 
of the Byzantine Empire. In fact, the state controlled this institution via its 
administrative apparatus and soldiers receiving pronoia did not facilitate the 
constitution a new social order.18
During the course of 11th and 12th centuries, the paroikoi became the 
prevailing feature of the Byzantine countryside. As the great landholders, high-
ranking state and ecclesiastic officials, called dynatoi, asserted an influence in 
provinces, the free peasants of the preceding centuries slowly disappeared. 
This process was often described as a brutal institution of larger estates and 
binding a peasant to the land. The reality was naturally much more complex. 
The landholding élite often used reserves of wealth acquired in service to 
the state to buy agricultural land from minor farmers in times of crop failure. 
This land was subsequently rented to peasants, who thus lost property and 
were in state of economic dependence on a landholder. This was paid in 
cash or the owner and peasant signed deals dividing the crop among them.19 
On the other hand, the peasant could not be forced to leave the land if he 
fulfilled his obligations. Such a larger domain was often under supervision of 
epitropos, an administrator who acted as a deputy for a landlord who resided 
in a city, where they often held position in administration or served in army. 
17  N. OIKONOMIDES, Title and Income at the Byzantine Court, in: N. OIKONOMIDES – E. 
A. Zachariadou (Eds.), Social and Economic Life in Byzantium, Aldershot 2004, p. 213.
18  For the institution of Pronoia, see most recently M. BARTUSIS, Land and Privilege in 
Byzantium: The Institution of Pronoia, Cambridge 2012.
19  LAIOU – MORRISON, pp. 106–112. Furthermore, paid labourers or slaves were also often 
utilized by the landholder. J. LEFORT, Rural Economy, Seventh–Twelfth Centuries, in: A. 
LAIOU (Ed.), The Economic History of Byzantium, p. 241.
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The estate itself did not operate as one compact venture but was divided to 
smaller parts rented to peasants. The dynatoi were in possession of beasts, of 
draught, mills and threshing floors which they gave for use to the paroikoi. 
In so doing, they reduced financial demands necessary for agricultural 
activities. Furthermore, the landlords organized the clearing of forests and the 
preparation of uncultivated land for the colonization.20 Quite paradoxically, 
whereas the free peasant of the 9th century was to pay lower taxes and dues 
than the non-proprietary peasants of the 12th century, these parokoi had often 
higher standard of living than their free predecessors. This was caused by the 
demographic expansion which caused the growth of the market, where the 
parokoi could sell their surplus. Average farmer capable of obtaining at least 
a pair of oxen could grow enough surplus to sell it.21 To increase revenue, wine 
and olives were often cultivated, as well as silkworm moth, followed by honey 
and wax.22 Though we cannot discount the possibility of landholders misusing 
their position, the main model of rented fields seems to be beneficial to both 
the peasant and the landholder. While the paroikos sought to cultivate the land 
and pay rent, the landholder possessed necessary equipment for paroikos to 
use.
Although 12th century Byzantium certainly offers a curious sight as far 
as socioeconomic development is concerned, the increasingly volatile security 
situation, both internal (uprisings) and external (invasions) left Byzantium in 
increasingly weakened state. In the end, not effectively controlling most of 
its territory and facing series of coups and rebellions, the Byzantine Empire 
could not successfully defend itself against the forces of the Fourth Crusade, 
which in 1204 sacked Constantinople and created several domains dominated 
20  LAIOU – MORRISON, pp. 102–105, 239; LEFORT, p. 240. Colonization was also 
supported by the state, which granted tax exemptions to the peasants settled on the new soil. 
LAIOU – MORRISON, p. 114.
21  LAIOU – MORRISON, p. 111. Laiou and Morrison also claim that further economic 
growth was caused by technical innovation(s) and higher effectiveness of labor. Frankopan 
disputes this cf. FRANKOPAN, p. 130.
22  LAIOU – MORRISON, pp. 108 –110.
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either by “Latin” elites or by mixed elites consisting of both Byzantine and 
Western descent. The internal weakness of the state thus brought onto the 
Empire such a blow which cemented the separation of the Byzantine state into 
various entities with lower probability of revival.23
But can we consider Byzantium a state of perpetual decline, increasing 
volatile internal situation and for various reasons defunct society long due its 
existence, as was once claimed? The economy certainly thrived, which can 
mirror similar development in Western Europe from the 11th century forth. 
This could lead us to an interesting conclusion that the overall economic thrive 
might have affected quite wider area, certainly including the provinces of the 
12th century Byzantium. Naturally, further study is required, although certain 
factors (the increase of commerce being certainly quite potent) must have had 
far reaching consequences not only in Western Europe itself, but in various 
other areas as well.
Abstract
The purpose of this article is to present various socioeconomic developments 
which occurred during the era of the Komnenian dynasty in Byzantium (1081–
1185). The work follows the most basic concepts of economy and introduces 
modern interpretation of recent historical research focused on this period. The 
themes include the development of trade, taxation, social composition of the 
countryside and analysis of the status of non-proprietary peasants, paroikoi.
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23  M. ANGOLD, Turning Point in History: The Fall of Constantinople, in: Byzantinoslavica: 
Revue Internationale des Études Byzantines, Vol. 71, No. 1/2, 2013 p. 23.
wbhr 02|2013
23
